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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
7HE STATE 0F UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
PICHARD LOUIS SMITH, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 19103 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, RICHARD LOUIS SMITH, apneals from a 
conviction and judgment of Theft by Receiving, a Second Degree 
Felony, and Theft by Decention, a Class A Misdemeanor, in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, RICHARD LOUIS SMITH, was charged with 
Thr,r t t>" l!ece iv i ng, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of 
1 tah ·de r\nn. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended), and Theft by 
r' 1r>, .i Clciss A C.lisdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
I 1953 as amended). He was convicted as charged 
1 i: tr1ct! and was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah 
• t 1t" 1'1 i '"''rt fnr the indeterminate term as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of both convictions and 
judgments rendered below and to have the remanded to 
the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about June 7, 1982, the residence of Steven 
Page was burglarized. Two rifles were among the property 
listed as taken (T.5), as well as jewelry, money, and stereo 
equipment (T.12) 
On that same day Appellant went to the Pavmee and 
Sportsman's Discount pawnshops and pawned a rifle at each place 
using his pictured prison identification card to complete both 
transactions. The pawn shop operators testified that Appellant 
made no efforts to disguise or distort his identity, signature, 
or thumb print which were required for the transactions (T.30, T.591 
At trial, Appellant testified that he was not aware the 
rifles were stolen when he pawned them. He said he received the 
rifles from his nephew, Ron Peterson, the mornina he pawned them 
(T.99). Peterson testified that Appellant was aware that the 
rifles were obtained in a burglary. Peterson admitted partic-
ipating in the Page residence burglary, but denied taking the 
guns (T.Supp.10). He said Appellant took them. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
OF THE EFFECT OF INCARCERATION ON APPELLANT'S 
HEALTH, AND OF THE BELIEF APPELLANT HAD REGARDING 
THE POWERS OF HIS PAROLE OFFICER, AS IT RELATED 
TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF APPELLANT COMMITTING THE 
OFFENSES CHARGED. 
Appellant contends the trial judge erroneously excluded 
evidence that was relevant and probative. The standard for 
admissibility of evidence is stated in Terry v. Zions Co-op 
Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 322 (Utah 1979). 
Relevant evidence is evidence that in some degree 
advances the inquiry and thus has probable value and is prima 
facie admissible. 
Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (July 1971), in 
effect during Appellant's trial, defines relevant evidence as 
"evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove 
the existence of any material fact." 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence (August 1983) which 
"onld be in effect during Appellant's new trial, defines relevant 
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
act10n probable or less probable than it would be without 
t lie:' "'-' l 1cncc 
R11le 402, Utah Rules of Evidence (August 1983) states 
1 1,,, 0nt evidence is admissible ... " 
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The judge did not let Appellant testify about the 
detrimental and severe effects incarceration had previously had 
on his health. The Court also disallowed testimony about what 
Appellant believed the powers of his parole officer were regarding 
incarcerating him. Both of these inquiries, had they been allowed, 
would have served to disprove the elements of the offenses charged 
insofar as Appellant's mens rea was concerned. 
The Theft by Receiving statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408, 
(1953 as amended) requires the element of knowledge or existence 
of probability that the receiver knew the property was stolen. The 
possession of the property invokes a presumption which the pros-
ecution may use to fulfill the knowledge requirement for the offense, 
as provided for in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402, (1953 as amended). 
Appellant's evidence would have related to that element and should 
have been allowed to rebutt a presumption. The evidence helped 
explain why Appellant would not knowingly be involved with stolen 
property. 
The proffered evidence was relevant because it would have 
advanced the inquiry into Appellant's state of mind and would have 
been probative as to his credibility and the likelihood that he 
would have intentionally committed the offenses. 
Appellant's testimony was that the prospect of incarcerath 
was an overwhelming deterrance from intentional criminal behavior 
his part. He was on parole and feared that his parole officer woul 
at any time detain him in jail for at least 15 days if he even 
suspected Appellant was invoked in any criminal activity. Appellac 
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tered particularly severe emphysema and tuberculosis attacks 
'{i1encver he had previously been jailed and the torment and 
sickness incarceration caused him was a valid reason he had for 
avoiding criminal activity. The jury should have been allowed 
to know about this aspect of Appellant's frame of mind and 
point of reference. His actions at the pawn shops were 
consistent with an innocent mind. The jury was deprived of 
this relevant evidence which was consistent with Appellant's 
innocent mind. It also was probative of his mentality and 
insightful regarding his credibility. 
Appellant did not deny that he pawned what were, in fact, 
stolen rifles. The only question for the jury was whether 
Appellant possessed the necessary knowledge and criminal intent 
when he did so. This evidence went to a material fact, was of 
consequence, would have aided the jury, and was prima facie 
admissible. Thus, the Court's ruling was erroneous and prejudicial 
to Appellant. It severely curtailed his defense of lack of mens 
rea. 
The Court may exclude relevant evidence if the situation 
•o warrants. This principle was codified in Rule 45, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, which governed and which provided: 
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, 
the Judge may in his discretion exclude evidence 
if he finds that its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the risk that its 
cidl'.lission will (a) necessitate undue consumption 
of time, or (b) create substantial danger of undue 
or of confusing the issues or of mis-
leading a jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully 
surprise a party who has not had reasonable 
opportunity to anticipate that such evidence 
would be offered. 
-s-
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (Auqust 1983) is 
essentially the same in substance and differs only in that it 
includes unfair prejudice and needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
The Court abused its discretion because none of the 
factors mentioned were present. The trial itself moved briskly 
along and was completed sooner than expected. The testimony was 
not prejudicial. It would have confused nothing, would not have 
misled the jury, nor surprised anyone, nor was it cumulative. 
It was revealing and an integral part of Appellant's defense. 
The standard for the Court was that the probative value be 
substantially outweighed by the risk of the presence of one 
or more of the aforementioned factors. The general principle 
that the usefulness of the evidence be more than counterbalanced 
by it's disadvantageous effects in confusing the issues before 
the jury, or in creating an undue prejudice in excess of its 
legitimate probative weight was not applicable here. Since 
the evidence was relevant it was admissible. Relevance is not 
always enough, however, so the question remains, is it worth 
what it costs? Here it was worth a great deal to the Appellant, 
had potential value to the jury, and it would have cost nothing. 
As this court stated in Terry (Supra) : 
It is generally conceded the trial court is 
more competent, in the excercise of this 
discretion, to judge the exigencies of a 
particular case and, therefore, when 
within normal limits, the discretion should not 
be disturbed. The general rule followed by this 
court will not be reversed unless it is shnwn 
that the discretion excercised there in i,as he en 
abused. (605 P.2d 322) 
I 1 int c0ntends that because none of the counter-balancing 
c which move the Court to exclude relevant evidence 
1 11, substantially outweight its probative value were 
'nt in this case, the Court abused its discretion by 
Ron Peterson, who admitted participation in the Page 
r)l)r']lar',' but •.Oenied any involvement with the guns, testified 
and adverse to Appellant. Buzz Palmer corroborated 
account. In light of the adversity of Peterson's 
basic fairness would have dictated that Appellant 
the opportunity to present all of his evidence for jury 
consideration. 
COIJCLUSION 
Ir. summary, Appellant respectfully submits that he was 
ienied a fair trial through the erroneous exclusion of probative 
Since his defense was grounded in the lack of mens rea 
reguired for the offense, he was effectively denied the right to 
rresent that defense. The Court abused its discretion in excluding 
r>"1dence since no counter-balancing factors calling for 
1u_-,1 Jn ',,ere riresent. 
Appellant respectfully moves this Court to reverse this 
3n I nrder a new trial wherein Appellant can present 
,,-,, dnd Jefense to a jury. 
! 1 l'1'TFTLI.'1 :;UBMITTED this day of August, 1984. 
--
:.!ANNY GARCIA 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this __'_J_ day 
of August, 1984. 
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